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On The Political Economy
Of Hong Kong Press System
While milch has been ioriiten about the recent slIifts in editorial stance
of the Hong Kong press in anticipation of tue transfer of sovereignty
from Britain to China, little attention. Iia« been paid to the causes of
these changes. This article examines the political economy of the Hong
Kong press system in the decade leading up to tile sovereignty transfer
and accounts for editorial changes by tracing siructuml changes in ilie
pattern of otonersnip.
Robert Stone
Chinese University ofHong Kong
MUch has been written about the press in Hong Kong, bothin anticipation of the Chinese resumption of sovereignty
and after that event. Not only has the media itself, both in Hong
Kong and internationally, been given to much rhetorical
questioning and pontificating about its own prospects in the
context of its editorial pages, but the topic is also the subject of a
growing variety of scholarly studies. The most important of these
is the 1991publication by Joseph Man Chan and Chin-Chuan Lee,
Mass Media and Political Transition, 1 in which they called attention
to a paradigm shift taking place in the Hong Kong media's
handling of political subjects related to China.
A variety of scholarly studies by them and other
researchers have followed, culminating most recently with a
rigorous survey-based study that looked into the socio-economic
situation and attitudes of journalists and in particular, the degree
to which they perceive and practice self-censorship.' This body
of literature presents a consensus that, compared to a decade ago,
there has indeed been, at the very least, a generalized softening of
the Hong Kong press toward China, if not a shift toward an
outright legitimation of the mainland regime.
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An area that has received relatively little attention,
however, has the been the political-economic structure of the Hong
Kong press system itself and the influence that this structure has
on its content.
This article seeks to do just that. Based on the ideas put
forward by J.H. Altschull in his book Agents ofPower 3 - simply
put, that the press serves those who hold the purse strings -- it
investigates the political economy of the Hong Kong press system
in the decade leading up to the sovereignty handover. Its intention
is to demonstrate that many of the perceived changes in the
editorial stances of Hong Kong newspapers can be attributed to
new sources of economic, and thus political, influence that have
resulted from recent shifts in ownership.
While it is well-known that Hong Kong is the largest source
of foreign capital investment in the People's Republic of China,
less well known is the fact that China is at the same time the largest
investor in Hong Kong, surpassing Britain, Japan and the United
States.' Though the total amount of China's investment in the
territory is unknown due to the opacity of Chinese accounting
procedures and company registration systems, it is generally
estimated that by the middle of the present decade there were in
excess of 3,000China-funded enterprises of various sizes operating
in Hong Kong. A conservative assumption is that China's
investment in Hong Kong at that time amounted to well over
US$70 billion. 5
China-affiliated companies in Hong Kong are involved
in a wide range of activities. Among the most well-known are
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC),
the Joint Publishing (Hong Kong) Company, China Resources, and
the Bank of China Group with its thirteen member banks. Some
China-funded companies have acquired stakes in some of Hong
Kong's most prominent enterprises. CITIC Hong Kong, for
example, directly supervised by the PRe's State Council, controls
about 12%of communications giant Hong Kong Telecom with even
greater stakes in Cathay Pacific Airways and Dragonair. Many
other Chinese companies have been established in key sectors of
Hong Kong's economy. Against this backdrop of capital
investment interflow a closer look at the fundamental economics
of the newspaper business on both sides of the border is called
for.
An owner's participation in and influence on a newspaper
can be described at two levels: Allocative control and operational
control. 6 The former refers to the direction of a paper's overall









goals, orientation and policies over the allocation of resources,
while the latter is more immediate and practical, concerning the
daily functioning of the paper within the parameters set by
allocative control. In contrast to papers owned by individuals or
family businesses, where both forms of control originate in the
same source, the principle shareholders of corporate papers
usually assume only allocative control, typically manifested by
attendance at a monthly management meeting.
In Hong Kong, only two papers l The Hong Kong Economic
Journal and Sing Pao are owned by individuals. The principal leftist
papers Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao l and Hong Kong Commercial
Daily are owned by various departments of the Chinese
government. All the remaining major papers are owned by public
corporations.
Owners can directly or indirectly prevent news or images
that are unfavourable to their interests from being published. Since
in Hong Kong, newspapers are in the hands of more than twenty
distinct ownership groups, ownership on its own is insufficient
to prevent a particular story from appearing in at least some
papers. In this sense, competition safeguards the watchdog
function of the press to some extent, although some media
conglomerates have greater power than others in this respect.
This situation, however, does not prevent the owners of
Hong Kong media from using their influence to attack opposition
or advocate their own interests. This is aptly illustrated by a bitter
public dispute that took place in January and February of 1995
between the Oriental Press Group and the territory's most
prominent broadcaster, TVB.
Having taken offence at a item about the prospects of
Eastern Express, an English-language paper owned by the Oriental
Group, in which a reporter on TVB's public affairs program Pearl
Watch mentioned unfavourable rumours about the owners of the
group, the Ma family, the group began publishing negative stories
about the television enterprise daily in almost all its publications
including the Oriental Daily Netas, East Magazine, Oriental Sunday
and Oriental Touch. This continued for a period of weeks until
TVB published a formal apology in the major newspapers of the
territory.
While it is not known whether the assault on TVB was
directly ordered by the Ma family, the incident demonstrates how
great the influence of ownership can be. And even though owners
may not make explicit commands, the management of any
publication is quick to guess the owner's response and attitude
in a given situation and act accordingly.
A further example is provided by the Hong Kong Daily
New's handling of information about the Emperor Group, its own
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holding company. After an article appeared in the Hong Kong
Economic Times reporting that the Emperor Group was accused of
fraud in China, Hong Kong Daily News published an
overwhelmingly one-sided article explaining the case on its front
page, using the Emperor Group as its only source. While the
article's influence on the case turned out to be negligible, the
conflict of interest involved is obvious.
Corporate owners may also sometimes sacrifice a paper
to gain other interests. Rupert Murdoch sold the Soutli China
Morning Post lest the paper's traditionally pro-British stance hinder
his plan to enter the China media market. 7
The logic of the marketplace, furthermore, tells us that
owners have sole control over the recruitment and firing of news
staff which vests them with the power to assemble journalistic
teams which automatically take the owner's interests into account."
Bearing in mind the potential for owners to exert pressure
on a newspaper's content and editorial stance, together with what
we know of the growing general integration of the Chinese and
Hong Kong economies, a closer examination of recent changes in
the ownership of the Hong Kong press reveals structural
realignments with profound implications for our understanding
of the nature of the press system itself and its reported to tendency
to slanttoward a softer editorial tone in relation to Chinese politics.
Having corne to the understanding that Hong Kong's
press system is primarily commercially based, it is evident that
the PRC authorities decided to use economic affiliation as a means
to co-opt the Hong Kong papers -- to in effect, manage the politics
of the transition by means of media acquisition by pro-China or
China-affiliated capitalists. As businessmen's political orientations
always are linked with their business, they will side with those
who support their business...The (Hong Kong-Macau) Affairs
Committee has decided to use resources to help build up pro-
China capitalists. 10
Thus, in regard to their personal and business ties with
the mainland, Hong Kong newspapers can be classified into three
groups: Those owned or subsidized by the PRC; those recently
acquired by China-affiliated capital; and those whose owners are
developing relationships in the PRC.
During the period leading up to the transfer of sovereignty
of Hong Kong from Britain to China, there were four overtly pro-
China papers published in Hong Kong, directly owned by various
elements within the Chinese Communist Party and thus under its
direct control. They are Wen Wei Po, Ta Kling Pao, its evening paper




















New Evening Pao, 11and the Hong Kong Commercial Daily. Though
registered as privately owned, the four receive subsidies from the
CCP and are under the control of the Propaganda Department of
the Hong Kong-Macau Affairs Committee. The first two claim to
have 120,000 and 100,000 local circulation respectively and
together the four account for 10.4% of the territory's total
expenditure on newspaper advertising. 12
After a breaking of ranks during the 1989 Tiananmen
crisis, the Chinese central government reorganized these four
papers, replacing some of their key editorial staff. The paper's
chiefs attended a formal briefing in Beijing on their different
propaganda roles in 1994.
With regard to their general orientations: Wen Wei Pao is
the formal mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party and
emphasises the announcement of official policy. Ta Kung Pao
promotes China's economic achievements and reports China
news. New Evening Pao concentrates on local Hong Kong news
and has a wider appeal to the general mass. Hong Kong Commercial
Daily appears to be less overtly partisan and focuses coverage on
cultural and educational matters. 13
The pro-China papers can look forward to improving
business prospects for three main reasons. First they do not have
a legitimacy crisis in their relations with the Chinese government
and Communist Party. Second, they enjoy the privilege of
distribution on the mainland which gives them a unique
competitive advantage in the advertising market. Finally, their
acknowledged close relations with the PRC gives them greater
authority than their competitors in the field of China news and
official Chinese policy.
Four significant Hong Kong papers have recently been
acquired in whole or part by China-affiliated capital, or owners
with close business or personal ties with the PRC or actively
seeking to expand businesses other than the newspaper itself into
China. They have in common the fact that their business interests
rely on the benevolence of the PRC government. South China
Morning Post and Ming Pao, two of the most influential papers
among educated and professional groups in English and Chinese
respectively are in this category, as are Tin Tin Daily News and
Hong Kong DailyNews.
China has long had the intention of co-opting the South
China Morning Post, Hong Kong's paper of record internationally
and its most comprehensive business and finance publication. 14
Robert Kuok Hock Nien, a Chinese-Malaysian businessman who
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owns Kerry Media Limited, purchased 34.9% of the South China
Morning Post from Murdoch's News Corporation and became the
paper's chairman in September 1993. 15 As a major player in
mainland capital investment, Kuok is understood to enjoy good
relations with the Chinese authorities. His investments in China
include hotels, property development, vegetable oil production
and joint venture bottling projects with Coca Cola. 16 Indeed,
those close relations were turned to advantage with Kuok
admitting that his purchase of the paper was facilitated by the
Bank of China which provided temporary bridging loans. While
the Post did not seem to undergo an immediate radical change in
its editorial line following the change in ownership, it was soon
no longer considered a pro-British paper and some analysts have
pointed to a measurable reduction in the number of political stories
about China. 18
A similar fate befell Ming Puo, which had long been
regarded as one of the most influential Chinese-language papers
among the educated and professional groups in Hong Kong.
Founded by Louis Cha in 1959 and owned by him until sold in
late 1991,MingPao again changed hands in November 1994,when
Oei Hong Leong of China Strategic Investment (CSI), an
Indonesian businessman with good business and relational ties
to the PRC, acquired a 51% stake and was appointed chairman of
the Ming Pao Enterprise Corporation."
Oei's relations with China date back to his early youth
whenhe left Indonesia to study on the mainland and found himself
caught up in the Cultural Revolution, after which he returned to
Indonesia and began his business career. In 1991, Oei shifted his
business operations to Hong Kong where he set about buying and
reforming state-owned enterprises on the mainland. His China
Strategic Investments holds mainland assets valued at more that
US$400 million including beer, rubber and paper-making. Oei is
now chairman of more than thirty joint venture enterprises in
various parts of China." In editorials on February 17 and 18/
1995, Ming Pao announced a new role as "a Chinese people's
paper" which would not be run in a way that "blindly follows the
way of Western liberalism. II 21
Ho Sai-chu, an overtly pro-China businessman, bought
the territory's third best selling paper Tin Tin Daily News with the
help of the New China News Agency in 1985. Subsequently, after
years of incremental purchases beginning in 1991, the Sing Tao
Press Group has come to hold 43% of Culturecom, the holding
company of the Tin Tin Daily News. Ho is now a minority owner
of the paper.
Sing Tao Press Group is one of the two largest media
publishing operations in Hong Kong. Its acquisition list includes
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SingTao lih Pao, SingTao Evening News, the English language Hong
Kong Standard and the two papers Tin Tin Daily News and Huanan
Jingji Journal under the holding company Culturecom.
Historically tied to Taiwan, the group has been fast developing
its publishing business in China since late 1992 when it publicly
distanced itself from KMT politics and its chairwoman, Solly Aw,
made a high profile visit to Beijing where she was received
personally by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister
Li Pengo
Hong Kong Daily News, the fourth best selling paper in
the territory, was acquired by the Emperor Group in 1992 and
Emperor (China Concept) Investments Ltd. is a substantial
shareholder of the paper. Yeung Hoi Shing, chairman of the
Emperor International Group is a delegate to the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Committee. 23 The group has close business
ties with the PRC government and in 1992 set up a joint venture
with a subsidiary company of the PRC's Judiciary Branch.
Still other Hong Kong papers have substantial business
interests on the mainland. The holding company of the Express
Daily, the Huanan Group, has investments in Nanjing, Tianjin and
Guangdong regions. Hong Kong Economic Times sponsors regular
trade and industrial exhibitions on the mainland and the Sing
Tao Group owns a printing company and paper product and







With its more than 1.1 billion increasingly affluent and
literate people, the Chinese mainland has long been an attractive
market for Hong Kong newspapers which compete vigorously
for limited local readership and advertising revenue in their home
territory. This attraction is further enhanced by the conventional
wisdom that says a foothold on the mainland increases the
possibility of establishing guanxi 25 with mainland government
officials to facilitate the expansion of other businesses.
To make these prospects even more enticing, the
mainland media market is flourishing. Yetas of 1992 there were
still only 40.2 copies of newspapers available per 1/000 Chinese,
still significantly below the ideal minimum established by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
showing that the China newspaper market still holds great
potential for further development. 26
Looked at in other terms, the China ma.rket seemed even
more appealing to Hong Kong publishers. China's 1994GDP was
RMB4,lOO,OOO billion, with more than one third of this amount
accounted for by retail goods, indicating the consumer market
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has strong purchasing power. In recent years the mainland has
experienced an astounding growth in expenditure on advertising,
going from RMB20 billion in 1989 to RMB134 billion in 1993 -
significantly outpacing the global growth in advertising
expenditure. Newspaper advertising alone accounted for RMB39
billion in 1993 - a 75% increase over 1992. Compared with Hong
Kong over the same period, the growth of the mainland market is
three times faster. 27
In yet another frame of reference, as the Economic Journal
concludes: "China, starting at a much lower base, is still on the
lower side of the curve and has a lot of room to climb upwards,
whereas Hong Kong, being at a more advanced stage of economic
development cannot expect to continue to grow much further...
Hence, it may be said that Hong Kong's future is more dependant
upon China's economic growth than vice versa, and future
development prospects are brighter for China than for Hong
Kong." 28
Despite the obvious attractions of the mainland market,
there were also pitfalls. First the PRe has a traditional suspicion
of foreign media enterprise and a fear of its potential damage to
ideological conformity and has thus a history of blocking its entry.
Second, as Hong Kong papers attempted to establish working
relationships within the PRC, the inevitable editorial compromises
they were called upon to make risked alienating their local readers
through loss of credibility. Third, the opacity of Chinese
regulations concerning the publishing industry and the tendency
of these regulations to change unpredictably in response to changes
in the Chinese political environment added a considerable element
of financial risk to efforts to achieve mainland penetration.
While the Chinese press has experienced profound
structural change, particularly since 1990, all publications are still
nominally owned by the government. During this period,
government mouthpieces have declined significantly both in
circulation and credibility while commercial papers including
papers for specific readership groups, professional papers and
evening and weekend papers have enjoyed growing acceptance.
The shift to a market economy has established the commodity
nature of the media in China and newspapers have had to compete
for readership and advertisers to survive. The emergence of
weekend papers and tabloids also demonstrates that readers are
exercising choice in their consumption.
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Enticed by such potential returns, the Hong Kong press has
been eagerly exploring ways to enter the China market. The main
hindrance to this effort, however, comes from the PRC's policy of
restricting the inflow of foreign media. Units controlling the media
in China include the following:
a) CCP Central Propaganda Department
b) CCP Central Secretariat Department
c) State Council Cultural Bureau
d) State Council News Office
e) State Council Public Security Department
Of the above, the News Office under the State Council is
the major unit regulating the press and has primary responsibility
for drafting laws, ordering and regulating the system, policy
formulation and implementation, censorship, development
planning, processing applications for the establishment of new
media units, regulating the market, suppressing illegal
publications, controlling printing and material supply, and
regulating exchange and cooperation with foreign media. 30
No newspaper can be published in China without a
United Publication Code issued by the News Office. To be
assigned the code a paper must have both an operation unit and
a leading unit. The operation unit refers to the superior
department supervising the paper while the leading unit is the
one that applies for the code. 31 There are still no privately owned
newspapers in China. All newspapers are officially either state-
owned or owned by public enterprises with government or Party
affiliation."
For the first three decades after the establishment of the
People's Republic in 1949, newspaper distribution was
accomplished solely through the postal system. In the early 1980s,
following the establishment of the reform and open policy,Chinese
publications were suddenly confronted with the 'three increases
and one reduction crisis," forcing newspapers to consider
undertaking the task of distribution themselves. By 1994, over
500 newspapers - about one third of the total - were doing entirely
without the postal service, while some papers are augmenting
the postal service with partial self-distribution, the two methods
now taking up about equal shares of the market. 34 Newspapers
in China also face regulated distribution restrictions. Some papers
can only circulate at the district level and national circulation is
forbidden them. The News Officealso decides which newspapers
are allowed to distribute outside the country. 35
Since, as we have seen, a newspaper must be affiliated
with an operation uni t in order to publish in China, the most
common approach for Hong Kong papers attempting to enter the
market is to seek the cooperation of a mainland enterprise - either
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by setting up a new newspaper jointly with a mainland unit or
buying equity in a paper already run by a mainland corporation.
While this procedure seems straightforward enough,
efforts to follow it have been plagued by fluctuating policy toward
joint venture publications. In May, 1993, for example, Hong Kong
optimism was raised by the drafting of a document by the CCP
Central Propaganda Department called "Opinion on the Direction
of Reforming Newspapers and Magazines (Draft)." The document
was extremely progressive by Chinese standards, suggesting
among other things, letting Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan
periodicals enter the market and set up new joint venture
periodicals with publications on the mainland, openly distribute,
and take part in competition. The docu merit suggested an
incremental approach beginning with periodicals dealing with
neutral subjects like sports and culture, and then moving to allow
science and academic publication and finally newspapers with
general content. 36 The document even went on to suggest that
after improving the system regulating the press and the related
laws, selective newspapers from the three places could be allowed
to distribute on the mainland with a view to promotin.g
competition and energizing the mainland newspaper market.
The bloom was off the rose a year later when the News
Office in 1994 announced the "Notification on Establishing Tier-
capital Joint Venture on News Publication," stating that all news
publications "are forbidden to set up foreign capital enterprises."
Joint ventures or cooperation in the news business was not to be
allowed. If any individual paper needed to set up a joint venture,
" ...it must report its application to the News Office to get
permission after investigation..." 18
To understand the PRC policy towards the Hong Kong
papers, one must take into account the fact that the press is a
sensitive area directly related to ideological and social control in
China. Furthermore, contemporary Chinese politics in
characterized by excessive factionalism. Publication policy thus
always depends on the state of the political environment at a given
time.
More recent evidence suggests that the policy is becoming
even more conservative. A document called "Twenty Items on
the Press" was issued during a National Propaganda Meeting held
in January 1995,restating the restrictions on setting up media joint
ventures.
In addition to prohibiting newspaper joint ventures,
measures were also taken to abort ventures that had been set up
under the previous, more liberal regulations. Ming Pao's holding
company CIM's joint venture paper Guangzhou Today was
ordered to shut down in December 1994 because the paper did
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not have a leading unit. China Daily suddenly stopped printing
Hong Kong Standard in Beijing due to "problems with printing
capacity." 40 The CCP Propaganda Department also proclaimed
that "news publication is a kind of special commodity, and will
not be freely decided by the market even in a market economy." 41
Despite these frustrations, there have been some limited
successes. As has been pointed out, Hong Kong's four pro-China
papers enjoy mainland distribution, seemingly free of the
encumbrances mentioned above and can even be found on street
newsstands in the special economic zones I ike Shenzhen and
Zhuhai.
Government departments and certain corporations are
allowed to subscribe to Hong Kong's two English papers, South
China Morning Post and Hong Kong Standard and these are also
allowed to be sold in mainland hotels.
The biggest success so far, however, has been that of
Culturecorn, the holding company of the Sing Tao Group. It was
given permission in late 1992 to set up Huanan lin]! Journal
specialising in economic news of South China. Other than the
four pro-China papers, Huanan {inji lournul is the only Hong Kong
based Chinese-language paper distributed both on the mainland
and Hong Kong. Since its inauguration in April 1993, the paper
has been losing money with its limited advertising revenue and a
circulation restricted by regulation to less than 15,000. The
enterprise would seem, however, to have ulterior motives.
Culturecorn's comic book series Buddhist Palm was licenced to a
Beijing publisher in 1993. The group represents a wide array of
other comic and entertainment publications and has plans for their
eventual distribution on the mainland as well. 42
In June 1993, the group established Xing Cuang Monthly
in a joint venture with a subsidiary company of People's Daily. 4,
The monthly is the first and so far only, Sino-Hong Kong publishing
joint venture. Freely distributed on the mainland, the magazine
deals mainly with economics, culture and social news, avoiding
any sensitive topics and without an editorial page. Xing CHang
Monthly has been soundly criticized for its slipshod presentation.
This is attributed to the fact that all editorial work is performed by
the Chinese side while the Sing Tao Group provides financial
support and distribution logistics. 44 The group has also printed
Screen Fans, an entertainment magazine for the Guangzhou
television station since July 1993.
The Group also began preparing, in 1993, to launch
another newspaper joint venture, Sllengang Economic Times, in
cooperation with the Shenznen Special Zone News, an organ of the
CCP Special Economic Zone Committee. If this venture succeeds,
the paper will be the first to specifically target an audience that
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straddles the border. Focusing on economic news and Hong Kong
general news, the paper will have a Hong Kong section and a
Shenzhen section.
The magnitude of advertiser influence on newspaper
economics depends on the diversity of both the sources of
advertising revenue and the media available in which to place
ads. If advertisers face a limited choice of channels through which
to promote their products and services, room for discriminative
practice is limited. For the papers, the more diversified the sources
of advertising revenue, the less possible it becomes for a single
advertiser to influence either the basic finances of the enterprise
or the editorial independence of the paper.
Revenue from advertising is vital to the survival of the
Hong Kong press. Not only are the more than two dozen dailies
competing for readers in a population of just six million but this
circulation base is shrinking. Whereas in the early 19805, about
one-third of the population read more than one newspaper each
day, a decade later the figure had dropped to 13% largely as a
result of a shift in audience habits in response to an expansion
and improvement of local television production and the provision
of more popular news, current affairs and entertainment
programing. A relatively saturated circulation market coupled
with fast rising newsprint and labour costs, together with
increasing investor caution in such a sensitive and thus volatile
sector, has placed advertisers in a position of power relative to
publishers. 45
The influence of advertisers on newspapers manifests
itself simply and directly. Faced with such a wide and competitive
choice in Hong Kong, advertisers are in a position to pull their
ads from publications perceived to be working against their
interests. Furthermore, while Hong Kong newspapers target a
different audience than mainland papers, they have recently
become competitors for some of the same advertising dollars. As
Hong Kong's China investment increases and the mainland
imports more consumer goods, advertising dollars are being
pulled northward. Advertising agencies have anticipated this.
One of the giants of the local scene, Saatchi & Saatchi, has even
gone as far as combining its Hong Kong and mainland operations
to form a "greater China division." Bozell Grey Advertising has
been training personnel for the mainland market. 46 Many joint
venture advertising agencies have been established in China and
the Association of Accredited Advertising Agents of Hong Kong
made a formal visit to Beijing in the Fall of 1994. 47
The effect of this state of affairs manifests itself in two
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ways, both with a negative impact on newspaper editorial
independence. The first is brought about through the normal
operation of market forces. The second impact results from the
strategic placement of advertising by China-affiliated enterprises
to effect changes in the Hong Kong press system.
In terms of normal market forces, Hong Kong
newspapers are facing both inter-media and intra-media
competition for advertising revenue. Not only are newspapers
losing ground to magazines for product and services advertising,
but property ads, 48 which had been the mainstay of newspaper
advertising revenue since the early 1990s,contracted significantly
between 1994and 1996in response to a cyclical slump in the Hong
Kong real estate market. 4'1 Add to this the fact that the popular,
mass-appeal papers are tending to garner advertising dollars at
the expense of the so-called quality pr1pers,and that they, by their
very nature, are the most deliberately vr1gue and non-critical in
their editorial policies to avoid alienating r1ny particular segment
of the market, and we see that market forces tend to favour the
non-critical papers.
The second impact -- the strategic placing of advertising
in the Hong Kong press -- was first brought to public attention
by an editorial appearing in the June 2,1992 edition of Ming Pao
which revealed that some Hong Kong publications had been
blacklisted by the PRC, and that all China-funded enterprises
had been "advised" not to place ads in them.
This is verified by the experience of the Hong Kong
Economic iournnl, a paper well-known for its critical editorials,
commentaries and unyielding attitude toward the Chinese
government, which has been boycotted by China-funded
corporations. While the paper admits that this seriously
undermines its advertising revenue base, it has no intention of
changing its editorial stance. so
On the other hand, judging from the advertising revenue
of Wen Wei Paa, one of the Hong Kong-based, pro-China
newspapers circulating in both Hong Kong and on the mainland,
there are concrete rewards for ideological compliance. Obviously
its special position makes it attractive to advertisers wishing to
target consumers on both sides of the border but the fact that it
ranks twelfth in terms of circulation while it is the fifth-highest
advertising revenue earner, gives added credibility to the theory
that Chinese advertising dollars are being strategically placed in
the Hong Kong media.
Definitive proof of this practice was finally provided by
Ming Pao in an article on June 4, 1993, in which two confidential
memos dated August 1991 and February 1992 from the Hong
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Kong and Macau Affairs Office to managers of Bank of China
subsidiaries were reproduced.. The leaked memos listed nine Hong
Kong newspapers and eleven magazines, forbidding managers
to place advertising in them. As might be expected, the list
included the Hong Kong Economic Times, Ming Pao, Hong Kong
Economic Journal, Sing Tao, and the Sing Tno Evening News. The
article went on to say that when confronted, an unnamed official
of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong confirmed the
existence of the blacklist. Sl
As we have seen, the period beginning in 1990 and
extending to mid- 1996 was a time of major restructuring in the
Hong Kong press system. This restructuring took place both as a
series of definable economic events including ownership changes
and fierce competition for a dwindling advertising market, and
as a more subtle but still observable political realignment.
The final eighteen months of this period, however, saw
more profound changes than any that had gone before.
Newspapers realigned themselves yet again, not only in the
marketplace, but also along the ideological spectrum in relation
to the politics of China. The first of these two themes was set in
motion by an even more severe shrinking media market pie as
Hong Kong's economy experienced relatively slower growth
compared to previous years, particularly in the property market,
a significant source of newspaper ad revenue.
Simultaneously, the constant and rapid rise in the cost of
newsprint pushed up production costs. The launching of a new
paper, Apple Daily, increased the demand for experienced
journalists, photographers and print production workers, forcing
media owners to raise salaries. The bitter price war that followed
caused a total of nine, mostly minor publications to fold and
withdraw from the market.
The second of these themes, the political, had equally
profound effects as some media owners planned for the possibility
of entering the mainland market after the handover while others
strategized their papers survival through a policy of political
accommodation.
Self-made entrepreneur Jimmy Lai's daring entry into an
already highly competitive Hong Kong newspaper market with
Apple Daily in June, 1995 was immediately successful with Apple
quickly achieving the second largest circulation in the market. Th-is
brought extreme pressure on other Chinese newspapers,
particularly the mass circulation dailies. These events brought
controversy and significant consequences.
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In his cleverly crafted promotional television spots for the
launch of his paper, Jimmy Lai had been pictured, William Tell
style, with an apple on his head while arrows flew, hitting him but
not the apple. The symbolism was prophetic. Not only did his
company receive threats and suffer sabotage of its property through
a couple of minor fire bombings, but was even boycotted initially
by some newspaper distributors. None of these actions were as
significant, however, as the cut-throat competition tha t AppleDaily
elicited from its competitors.
First, in early December 1995, Orienta] Daily announced
that it would lower its news stand price to two dollars from five.
This took the entire industry by surprise but other papers quickly
imitated Oriental's initiative. Apple Daily lowered its price from
five to four dollars and Sing Pao dropped from five to two dollars
the next day. Within a week Hong Kong Daily NerDS was down to
just one dollar from five and Tin Tin Dailywas at two. Other papers,
notably the pro-China group, the financial papers and the English
language press, stayed out of the fray.
Going into the price war, Oriental had enjoyed a marginal
circulation advantage over Apple Daily. Within a short time Oriental
was claiming to have doubled its circulation while Apple was
admitting a ten per cent decline. Other papers, both those
participating in the price war and those that were not, also suffered
circulation loses while overall newspaper sales jumped due to
cheaper prices. It was clear that these conditions could not be
sustained for long.
The competitive environment soon began to claim victims
- at first, mostly papers that had been operating in loss positions
going into it. The entertainment publication TV Daily folded just
one day into the price war. Hong Kong United Daily, long supported
against its losses by Taiwan's United Daily, closed in mid-
December. The same day the Express announced a "temporary
closure." These actions put hundreds of journalists and related
workers out of employment and owners who had been forced to
pay higher wages as Apple had come on the market, now attempted
to freeze or renegotiate salaries with their staff. In January Fresh
Magazine, an entertainment weekly of the Culturecom Group
folded. Six months later, the English language, Eastern Express,
owned by the Oriental Press Group, also closed its operation
although for reasons only partly related to the price war.
Although the price war involved most of the Chinese
language newspapers in Hong Kong whether they participated or
not, the principal conflict was between the Oriental Press Group
and Jimmy Lai's Next Media Croup." Early in the price war,
Oriental Press Group announced that it wou ld lower the price of
Eastweek from eighteen to eight dollars in direct competition with
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Next Magazine. A month later, Next dropped its price from eighteen
to twelve dollars.
The price war entered a second phase in late February
1996 when Jimmy Lai, who had made his initial fortune in the
retail garment trade, announced that he had sold all his shares in
Ciordando, his chain of clothing shops, and had realized HK$l.4
billion with which he was prepared to continue subsidizing his
print empire. A week later he paid a highly visible call on Oriental
Press Group chairman Ma Ching Kwan. While both parties claimed
that no agreements had been struck at the meeting, Oriental Daily's
price rose from two dollars to three and the price of Easttveek: went
from eight to ten dollars while NextMagazine rose to fifteen dollars.
Other papers began to follow. In mid-March, Tin Tin Daily
began to raise its price in stages back to the original five dollars.
Hong Kong Daily did the same. Apple Daily waited until June to
raise its price back to the original five dollars.
Apart from the rather marginal papers that had been
forced out of the market it seemed clear that the remaining players
would continue to exist and suffer at least into the medium term
future. Accordingly, the motivation to fight was gradually replaced
by a desire for coexistence. Thus by July 1996, the price war was
over with all the participants having restored the original prices of
their publications with the exception of Sing Pao which remained
at three dollars.
Conclusion
Increasing Sino-Hong Kong economic integration has put
China in an advantageous posi tion with respect to the Hong Kong
press system. The influence of ownership structure, sources and
scale of advertising revenue, and the mainland marketing
considerations of the Hong Kong newspaper industry all combine
as pressures toward compliance with and away from criticism of
China's political desires in respect to the Hong Kong media agenda.
The implications for press freedom and pluralism in Hong
Kong are obvious. Despite the conventional wisdom that says a
vibrant market economy will support a free and pluralistic press,
the invisible hand of the market is clearly no guarantee in Hong
Kong. S3 While an explicit intervention by China, overt censorship
of the Hong Kong press, for example, would no doubt alienate
public opinion and thus jeopardize prospects for continued stability
and prosperity in the territory, such a tactic is unnecessary. In Hong
Kong the PRe is exerting its influence on the press system by
following the rules of the game of the marketp lace. Ironically;
formal censorship is not needed.•
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